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Abstract— This paper presents LinBFT, a novel Byzantine fault 
tolerance (BFT) protocol for blockchain systems that achieves 
amortized O(n) communication volume per block under 
reasonable conditions (where n is the number of participants), 
while satisfying determinist guarantees on safety and liveness. 
This significantly improves previous results, which either incurs 
quadratic communication complexity, or only satisfies safety in a 
probabilistic sense. LinBFT is based on the popular PBFT 
protocol, and cuts down its O(n4) complexity with three tricks, 
each by O(n): linear view change, threshold signatures, and 
verifiable random functions. All three are known, i.e., the 
solutions are right in front of our eyes, and yet LinBFT is the first 
O(n) solution with deterministic security guarantees. 
Further, LinBFT also addresses issues that are specific to 
permission-less, public blockchain systems, such as anonymous 
participants without a public-key infrastructure, proof-of-stake 
with slashing, rotating leader, and a dynamic participant set. In 
addition, LinBFT contains no proof-of-work module, reaches 
consensus for every block, and tolerates changing honesty of the 
participants for different blocks. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The blockchain technology, pioneered by Bitcoin [23], 
promises to revolutionize finance with a secure, decentralized 
and trustless protocol for processing transactions, which 
include money transfers and smart contracts [12]. Many 
blockchain systems nowadays, however, suffer from poor 
scalability and slow confirmations, and consume vast amounts 
of energy [10]. At the heart of the problem is the widely-used 
proof-of-work (PoW) census mechanism, in which special 
power nodes, called miners, compete to solve cryptographic 
puzzles in order to gain the privilege of confirming 
transactions. Aside from scalability, latency and sustainability 
issues, PoW also inevitably forks [16], i.e., different nodes may 
have conflicting views of the blockchain. Consequently, PoW 
usually requires a separate mechanism, e.g., waiting for a 
number of confirmations, to ensure transaction finality in a 
probabilistic sense, which introduces uncertainty and 
exacerbates the latency problem. In addition, PoW chains are 
vulnerable to the so-called “51% attack”, in which an adversary 
with overwhelming computation power (e.g., an ASIC maker, 
or a botnet) deliberately forks the blockchain to invalidate 
previously confirmed transactions. 51% attacks are becoming 
increasingly common: notably, a recent one compromised 
                                               
1 https://www.coindesk.com/blockchains-feared-51-attack-now-
becoming-regular/ 
Bitcoin Gold1, which involves a relatively large number of 
nodes, and was designed to be ASIC-resistant. 
An attractive alternative to PoW is Byzantine Fault 
Tolerance (BFT), which involves negligible computations, 
guarantees no fork, and promises near-instant block finality. 
BFT has been well-studied in the context of distributed systems. 
However, there is much confusion on how to apply BFT in a 
blockchain setting, which is quite different from traditional 
distributed systems. Most importantly, BFT has been perceived 
to be a communication-heavy protocol. In particular, there is a 
long-standing myth that BFT is not scalable to the number of 
participants n, since most existing solutions incur the 
transmission of Ω (n2) messages, even under favorable network 
conditions. As a result, existing BFT chains involve very few 
nodes (e.g., 21 in [14]), which can be elected delegates [14], 
PoW winners [21], or a random sample set obtained through 
cryptographic sortition [18][16]. As discussed in [18][16], 
having fixed delegates defeats decentralization, and PoW 
introduces uncertainty in the participant set due to forks. 
Sortition-based BFT, on the other hand, only provides 
probabilistic guarantees on safety (i.e., no fork); further, its 
probability of failure is only small enough with a large sample 
(minimum a few hundred nodes [18]), which might be already 
beyond the capacity of currently deployed BFT chains (e.g., 21 
nodes in EOS [14], and up to 16 in Hyperledger Fabric [11]). 
This paper dispels the myth with a novel BFT protocol, 
called LinBFT, that achieves amortized O(n) transmission cost 
per block with deterministic guarantees on safety and liveness, 
under reasonable assumptions, elaborated in Section III. This is 
clearly optimal, in the sense that disseminating a block already 
takes Ω(n) transmissions2. LinBFT is based on PBFT [5], an 
O(n4) solution, and reduces its communication costs with three 
tricks, each by O(n): linear view change [1], threshold 
signatures [18], and leader selection via verifiable random 
functions (VRFs) [16]. All three exist in previous methods, and 
their combination is simple; yet, to the author’s knowledge, 
LinBFT is the first amortized-O(n) BFT protocol with 
deterministic security guarantees. 
The proposed protocol is designed for permission-less, 
public blockchains, for which there are additional challenges 
not commonly encountered in other BFT settings. For instance, 
participants can be anonymous, without a centralized public 
key infrastructure (PKI). Consequently, nodes must exchange 
2 Although it is impossible to obtain sublinear transmission volume, a 
method can still have sublinear communication time in an ideal 
environment. LinBFT achieves best-case O(log n) time through 
speculative execution, described in Section IV-A. 
public keys among themselves, and participate in a distributed 
key generation (DKG) protocol required to create threshold 
signatures, both of which are communication-heavy processes. 
Meanwhile, LinBFT is compatible with proof-of-stake (PoS), 
which counters Sybil attacks and deters dishonest behavior 
through slashing, as described in Section II-B. Additionally, 
LinBFT has the following desirable features: 
• No PoW. This avoids uncertainty due to inherent forks in 
PoW, be it in the participant set, leader selection, or block 
confirmation. More importantly, this eliminates 51% 
attacks, which are a serious risk for new, smaller PoW 
chains. 
• Per-block consensus. There is consensus for each 
individual block, rather than for a group of blocks, e.g., in 
Casper [3]. This limits the power of the block proposer, 
and, thus, mitigates selfish mining. 
• Rotating leader. The proposed protocol changes the leader 
(i.e., block proposer) for every block, which reduces the 
risk of denial-of-service attacks on the leader. 
• Changing honesty. In LinBFT, a participant can be honest 
for one block, and malicious for another (e.g., one 
containing a transaction of interest to the participant), as 
long as over 2/3 of all participants are honest for each 
block. In other words, it is possible that every participant 
is malicious at some point, and yet the blockchain remains 
secure at all times. 
• Dynamic participant set. LinBFT allows nodes to join and 
leave the protocol at the beginning of epochs (explained 
in Section IV-C. As a result, it is possible that different 
blocks are verified by completely different sets of nodes. 
II. PRELIMINARIES 
A. PBFT with Linear View Change 
The basis of LinBFT is PBFT [5], a classic BFT protocol that 
requires O(n2) transmissions in its best case, and O(n4) in the 
worst case. PBFT can be used to obtain consensus on a block 
in a blockchain setting (e.g., implemented in [2]), as follows. 
Assume that there are n = 3f+1 nodes in total, among which f 
are malicious. The protocol involves one or more rounds, each 
of which has a leader node, which can be chosen, e.g., in a 
round-robin manner. The leader in the i-th round (denoted by 
Li) proposes a block bi, and broadcasts its hash value hi in a 
Prepare message. Upon receiving such a Prepare, a node that 
is either not locked or already locked on the same digest hi 
(locking is elaborated shortly) responds by broadcasting 
Prepare messages on hi. Once a node receives 2f+1 Prepare’s 
on hi, it assembles them into a commit certificate (CC), locks 
on hi, and broadcasts Commit messages about the CC. A node 
who receives 2f+1 Commit’s on the CC of hi is ready to finalize 
block bi, after verifying all transactions in the block. 
Linear View Change. When consensus cannot be reached 
in a round i within a given timespan, the protocol enters a new 
round i+1 with a different leader Li+1, which is called a view 
change. Possible causes for a view change include a malicious 
leader (who can simply remain silent throughout the round), or 
message losses due to network failures. The original PBFT 
protocol involves O(n3) transmissions per view change. A 
recent algorithm called linear view change (LVC) reduces the 
cost to O(n2) [1]. Without network failures, there can be at most 
f view changes due to malicious leaders, leading to O(n3) 
overall communication complexity with LVC, or O(n4) in the 
original PBFT. 
LVC works as follows. At the beginning of a new round Li+1, 
each node sends a NewView message to Li+1, along with the 
commit certificate it is locked to, if any. Li+1 then broadcasts the 
CC with the highest round number among all collected CCs, 
along with the hash hi+1 of its proposed block bi+1. A locked 
node unlocks, whenever it receives a CC with a higher round 
number compared to the one it is currently locked to [1]. Since 
a CC contains 2f+1 Prepare messages, it has size O(n); thus, 
collecting and broadcasting a CC cost O(n2) transmissions. 
Safety, liveness, and partial synchrony. Two fundamental 
requirements for a BFT protocol are safety (i.e., once the 
protocol finishes, all honest nodes agree on the same block) and 
liveness (the protocol eventually terminates). PBFT satisfies 
safety as long as n ≥ 3f+1, even in the presence of network 
failures. It satisfies liveness in a partially synchronous network 
[9], in which there can be arbitrary network failures until a 
particular time point (not known beforehand), after which the 
network becomes synchronous. Here, network synchrony is 
defined as the condition that any message sent from one honest 
node to another is guaranteed to be delivered correctly within 
D time, where D only depends on the length of the message. 
B. Threshold Signatures 
The communication cost of PBFT can be reduced by another 
factor of O(n) with threshold signatures, each of which 
combines multiple signatures into one, and, thus, reduces the 
size of a commit certificate from O(n) to O(1) [1]. Formally, an 
(n, t)-threshold signature on a message m is an aggregate 
signature that passes verification if and only if no less than t+1 
participants sign m. Accordingly, a CC in PBFT can be 
implemented using a threshold signature with t = 2f. Note that 
the verifier of a threshold signature does not need to know the 
identifies of the signers, which eliminates the need to include a 
size-O(n) identity vector in the aggregate signature, e.g., as is 
done in [25]. LinBFT employs a popular implementation of 
threshold signature based on the BLS signature scheme [4]. 
Setup costs of threshold signatures. Note that threshold 
signature is not free lunch, a fact that is sometimes ignored in 
the literature. In particular, a threshold signature scheme 
requires special, correlated public / private key pairs. 
Generating such key pairs in a decentralized setting requires a 
distributed key generation (DKG) protocol, which is 
communication-heavy. For example, the Joint-Feldman 
algorithm [17], e.g., used in Dfinity [18], requires each node to 
broadcast the coefficients of an order-t polynomial. This incurs 
O(n2t) transmissions, which is O(n3) when t = 2f = O(n). Further, 
the original proposal in [17] requires network synchrony, which 
is relaxed in later work, e.g., [20], at the expense of even higher 
worst-case communication overhead. LinBFT employs the 
DKG solution in [7], which requires O(n polylog n) 
communications with a given participant set, and provides a 
probabilistic guarantee on the correctness of the generated key 
pairs. This method requires a common source of randomness 
among the participants, which is conveniently provided by 
LinBFT through verifiable hash functions, detailed next. 
C. Verifiable Hash Function with Consensus 
A verifiable hash function (VRF) is a pseudo-random generator 
whose output is verifiable (i.e., on whether a given number is 
indeed the output of the VRF), random, uniformly distributed, 
and unpredictable beforehand. A simple VRF (e.g., used in 
Algorand [16]) under the random oracle model (i.e., there 
exists an ideal hash function H whose outputs are random and 
uniform), is H(s), where H is the ideal hash function and s is a 
signature that satisfies uniqueness, i.e., there is a unique 
signature for a given message and a private key. The BLS 
signature scheme [4], for instance, satisfies this property. The 
output of H(s) is clearly random and uniform, due to the random 
oracle assumption. Meanwhile, given the source message m 
(from which s is obtained) and s’s corresponding public key, 
one can verify that a given value is indeed the result of H(s). 
Further, the function’s output is unpredictable, since it is 
infeasible to obtain s without knowledge of its secret key. 
LinBFT additionally requires the VRF to reach consensus 
among a supermajority (i.e., 2f+1) of nodes. This is done by 
hashing a BLS threshold signature ts, i.e., H(ts), which is used, 
e.g., in Dfinity [18]. In the BFT setting, this ensures that the 
VRF remains unpredictable in the presence of f malicious nodes. 
III. PROBLEM SETTING 
A. Cryptographic Foundation 
LinBFT operates in the random oracle model of cryptography, 
with an ideal hash function H explained in Section II-C. In 
practice, H can be approximated with a cryptographical one, 
such as SHA-3 [8]. Additionally, since LinBFT employs BLS 
signatures [4], it inherits the latter’s underlying assumptions, 
e.g., the hardness of discrete logarithm on an elliptic curve with 
pairing. 
B. Proof-of-Stake 
Proof-of-stake (PoS) is a common technique to counter Sybil 
attacks, i.e., one single person or entity pretends to be many 
participants by registering numerous accounts in the system. In 
the presence of such attacks, it is no longer appropriate to define 
BFT’s honest supermajority requirement based on the number 
of nodes, since multiple nodes can belong to the same entity. 
PoS addresses this problem by mandating that each 
participant deposit to a special account a certain amount of 
money (call its stake) in the form of cryptocurrency tokens of 
the blockchain3. The stake can only be withdrawn after the 
participant quits the protocol. Clearly, under PoS, the number 
                                               
3  PoS can also be implemented with different participants staking 
different amount of tokens, and having influence proportional to their 
respective stakes. For ease of presentation, the rest of the paper 
assumes a fixed amount of stake for each participant, i.e., all 
participants are equal, and multiple participants can be controlled by 
the same entity. 
of accounts that a single person or entity can register is limited 
by its financial resources. Thus, the honest supermajority 
requirement of BFT can be defined as over 2/3 of the staked 
money is honest. With every participant staking the same 
amount, this requirement can be stated in the familiar form of 
n ≥ 3f+1. As pointed out in [16], the honest-money condition is 
comparable to PoW’s assumption that most of the computation 
power in the system is honest, since money can buy 
computational power. 
Slashing. In some PoS systems such as Casper [3], a 
participant that is caught cheating gets slashed, meaning that 
the cheater is kicked out of the participant set with its stake 
confiscated. It is argued in [3] that removing the cheater’s stake 
from the system altogether (i.e., the staked tokens go to a “black 
hole” that cannot be transferred to anyone) reduces the total 
token supply of the blockchain, and, thus, pushes up the price 
for each token. Intuitively, this compensates for the damage 
done by the dishonest participant. 
C. Adversary Model 
Out of the n participants of LinBFT, f (satisfying that n ≥ 3f+1) 
can be malicious for each execution of the protocol, which can 
misbehave in arbitrary ways4. The remaining participants are 
honest, who strictly follow the protocol.  Since the malicious 
nodes can collude, one can view them as corrupted and 
controlled by a single mastermind, referred to as “the 
adversary”. LinBFT assumes that the adversary is static and 
rushing (i.e., it has to choose the f nodes to corrupt before a 
protocol run), rather than adaptive (which can instantly 
compromise any node at any time). Note that for a fast protocol, 
the adaptive-adversary assumption might be overly pessimistic. 
Further, the adversary is assumed to take time to compromise 
nodes. In LinBFT, this time is assumed to be no less than the 
duration from the point when a block at a certain height (say l) 
is first finalized by a node, to the beginning of the protocol for 
the next block height l+1. The reason for this is explained later 
in Section IV-B. 
Since the blockchain setting contains an infinite number of 
transactions split into blocks, it is important to clarify the 
timespan over which f is defined. As an extreme case, if the 
adversary is limited to corrupting f nodes for the entire lifetime 
of the blockchain, then, once we catch those f bad actors, we no 
longer need BFT since all remaining nodes are honest. In 
LinBFT, the honesty of a participant is allowed to change from 
block to block, e.g., an honest participant may become 
malicious when it encounters a transaction that strongly 
motivates it to cheat. Accordingly, over multiple blocks, it is 
possible that every participant is malicious at some point, and 
yet the system remains secure as long as n ≥ 3f+1 holds for each 
block. In this sense, LinBFT provides stronger security 
4 Some protocols such as SBFT [15] distinguish malicious nodes  that 
actively send falsified messages from fail-stopped ones that crash 
temporarily, in order to obtain higher fault-tolerance capacity. LinBFT 
does not make this distinction since it is hard to estimate the proportion 
of each type in practice. 
compared to systems (e.g. Casper [3]) that run consensus once 
for multiple blocks. Meanwhile, the changing honesty 
assumption makes it necessary to place the condition that the 
adversary cannot carry over knowledge of private keys of 
malicious nodes from one execution of the protocol to another. 
D. Communication Model 
Following common practice in the literature, LinBFT assumes 
that the network is partially synchronous [9], i.e., after an 
unknown future time, any message between two honest nodes 
is delivered within D time, as explained in Section II-A. This 
model also captures the more common situation that periods of 
synchrony and asynchrony interleave, and there are sufficiently 
long periods of synchrony that allow the protocol to finish [1]. 
It is worth pointing out that the parameter D above does not 
take into account the network topology, or the total amount of 
network traffic. For instance, an all-to-all broadcast, which 
clearly involves Ω(n2) messages, can be said to take O(n) time, 
since every node sends/receives n–1 messages, each of which 
takes constant time, i.e., up to D. This analysis is not valid when 
the network has a saturated critical link, e.g., when half of the 
nodes reside in America and the other half in China. In this case, 
since Ω(n2) traffic pass through this critical link with limited 
bandwidth, the total time is no less than Ω(n2). For this reason, 
LinBFT focuses on minimizing communication volume rather 
than time, as discussed in the next subsection. 
Lastly, LinBFT involves both broadcast and single-cast 
communications. Thus, it is not compatible with a gossip-only 
setting, e.g., [6][16]. In reality, single-casts are ubiquitous, e.g., 
a browser connecting to a web server, and gossip-only settings 
might be overly restrictive. 
E. Security and Performance Objectives 
Security objectives. As a BFT protocol, LinBFT must satisfy 
safety (i.e., no fork) and liveness (the protocol eventually 
terminates) when the number of malicious nodes is less than a 
third of all participants (i.e., n ≥ 3f+1), explained in Section II-
A. Specifically, in a partially synchronous network described 
in the previous subsection, LinBFT satisfies both safety and 
liveness deterministically, with zero chance of failure. Further, 
LinBFT also satisfies deterministic safety even when the 
network is asynchronous, i.e., it never forks. 
Additionally, LinBFT also aims to maintain decentralization 
by limiting the power of individual nodes, and to mitigate the 
problem of selfish mining, in which a block producer prioritizes 
certain transactions over others. This is done by changing the 
leader (who proposes new blocks) for every block height and 
every round within the same height, and choosing the leader 
uniformly, elaborated in the next section. 
Performance objectives. LinBFT aims to achieve 
amortized O(n) worst-case transmission volume per block, 
unless with negligible probability, subject to the following 
conditions. First, the communication complexity is calculated 
based on messages required to complete the protocol, e.g., 
invalid messages sent by malicious nodes do not count. Second, 
since LinBFT does not guarantee progress during periods of 
asynchrony (which is impossible according to [13]), and such a 
period can be arbitrarily long, it is necessary to only consider 
transmissions during network synchrony. These assumptions 
are implicitly made in most BFT protocol analyses. 
Third, since there is a large setup cost for generating and 
exchanging keys, the participant set cannot change too 
frequently. For instance, exchanging public keys and IP 
addresses between each pair of nodes already take O(n2) 
transmissions.  In the literature, such costs are often hidden by 
assuming the existence of a centralized public-key 
infrastructure (PKI), which is not practical in a permission-less, 
public blockchain setting. To amortize the setup costs, LinBFT 
divides time into epochs of length O(n), and nodes can only join 
or leave at the beginning of each epoch, which is detailed later 
in Section IV-C. 
Lastly, slashing (Section III-B) can also lead to a high 
communication cost. In an extreme case that all f = O(n) nodes 
are slashed in the same protocol run, the remaining O(n) honest 
nodes need to know the cheaters’ identities, leading to O(n2) 
transmissions. Hence, linear complexity can only be obtained 
with at most a constant number of slashes per protocol run. 
More slashes lead to a higher communication cost (quadratic in 
the worst case), but do not affect safety or liveness. Note that 
the time loss due to slashing is compensated financially by 
confiscating the cheaters’ stakes, as explained in Section II-B. 
Communication volume vs. time. LinBFT focuses on 
minimizing total transmission volume rather than time, since (i) 
the latter varies depending on the network topology and traffic 
conditions and (ii) time complexity is no better than 
transmission complexity, when there exist saturated critical 
links, as explained in Section III-D. Nonetheless, in the ideal 
case with a synchronous network and no malicious node, 
LinBFT obtains O(log n) communication time through 
speculative execution, elaborated in the next section. 
IV. LINBFT 
LinBFT is executed once for each block height l, and only 
moves on to the next height l+1 when a supermajority, i.e., 2f+1 
nodes, reach consensus on a block to be added to the blockchain 
at height l. Hence, it suffices to focus on the protocol run on 
one particular height l. Meanwhile, inside a protocol run, there 
may be one or more rounds, each of which has a leader, denoted 
as Li for the i-th round. In the following, Section IV-A describes 
the protocol run in the ordinary case, where no node 
misbehaves, and the network is synchronous. Further, the 
ordinary case assumes that necessary infrastructure is already 
in place, such as public / private keys for threshold signatures. 
Section IV-B deals with malicious nodes, and present the view 
change and leader rotation schemes. Section IV-C handles 
changes in the participation set. Section IV-D summarizes the 
protocol and provides security and performance analyses. 
A. Ordinary Case 
Similar to PBFT, LinBFT finishes the ordinary case in a single 
round (i.e., round 1), in three steps: Preprepare, Prepare and 
Commit. As in PBFT (described in Section II-A), in the first 
step, the leader (i.e., L1) broadcasts a Prepare command 
containing the hash digest h1 of its proposed block b1. Upon 
receiving such a message, a node (say, node u) needs to notify 
all others on its acceptance of h1 in the form of a signed Prepare 
message. However, unlike in PBFT, in LinBFT u cannot simply 
broadcast its Prepare on h1, since an all-to-all broadcast would 
cost O(n2) transmissions. 
As in PBFT, the purpose of the Prepare messages is to 
ensure that in each round, at most one block hash receives 
Prepare votes from a quorum, i.e., 2f+1 nodes; only this block 
hash proceeds to the Commit step. LinBFT applies a standard 
trick (e.g., used in [15][19]) with a collector that collects and 
aggregates Prepare votes from all nodes. A natural choice for 
the collector is the leader L1. In the ordinary case, L1 collects 
Prepare’s from all n nodes on h1. Then, L1 derives an (n, t = 
2f+1)-threshold signature ts(h1) on h1 from these Prepare 
messages, and creates a commit certificate CC1, as follows. 
CCi = <i, hi, ts(hi)>. (1) 
The size of the above commit certificate is constant, since a 
threshold signature is of constant size (refer to Section II-B).  
After that, L1 broadcasts CC1 to all nodes, each of which 
responds with a  Commit message with its signature on CC1. 
Again, LinBFT uses a collector to avoid all-to-all broadcasts of 
Commit’s, and the collector’s role is naturally fulfilled by the 
leader, L1. In particular, L1 collects Commit’s from all n nodes, 
derives an (n, 2f+1)-threshold signature ts(CC1) on CC1, and 
broadcasts ts(CC1). Once a node receives ts(CC1), it finalizes 
block b1 (i.e., by adding it to the local copy of the blockchain) 
after verifying its transactions5. This completes the protocol. 
 
Fig. 1 Example that a leader Li serves as a collector for Prepare and Commit 
messages, computes threshold signatures, and re-broadcasts certificates. 
Speculative execution in O(log n) time. In the ordinary case, 
all n nodes sign h1 and CC1, meaning that there is no ambiguity 
on the signers. Thus, it suffices to use multi-signatures of all 
nodes instead of threshold signatures. This makes it possible to 
apply the CoSi protocol [25], which organizes all nodes into a 
balanced tree, each of which collects and aggregates 
(multi-)signatures from its child nodes. According to [25], CoSi 
achieves O(log n) time under the synchronous network 
assumption, i.e., each constant-sized message is delivered in 
constant time. The total transmission volume remains O(n). 
Note that this (optional) CoSi run is speculative: if any node 
fails to collect valid signatures from all its children, it notifies 
the leader L1, and the protocol then falls back to threshold 
signatures. 
                                               
5  Transactions in a block bi can be verified either before sending 
Prepare on its hash hi, or before finalizing the block. The latter enables 
block transmission to be done in parallel to the protocol messages. 
B. View Change and Leader Rotation 
With the presence of malicious nodes, a round can fail to reach 
consensus for a variety of reasons, e.g., a malicious leader can 
simply remain silent indefinitely6. To ensure liveness, each 
node sets a timer for every round. When the timer expires, a 
view change is triggered, and the protocol enters a new round, 
say, round i+1. LinBFT handles a view change with the LVC 
algorithm [1], explained in Section II-A. Specifically, the 
leader of the new round (i.e., Li+1) now serves as the collector 
for the NewView, Prepare and Commit messages. Since the size 
of a commit certificate is constant according to Equation (1), 
the total transmission cost of a view change is O(n). 
Random leader selection. In PBFT, there can be a 
cascading sequence of f faulty leaders, leading to f+1 = O(n) 
rounds. LinBFT avoids this situation by selecting leaders 
randomly, using a VRF (refer to Section II-C). With random 
leaders, the probability of having a sequence of malicious 
leaders diminishes exponentially with the length of the 
sequence. Specifically, with f < n/3 malicious nodes, having a 
sequence of x malicious leaders has probability smaller than 
1/3x. Therefore, the probability that the next leader is malicious 
becomes negligible (i.e., smaller than a given r) after a constant 
number (x > –log3 r) of leader changes. In practice, a common 
choice of r is 10–18, whose inverse is larger than the total 
number of seconds since the beginning of the universe [16]. 
Random leader selection requires a common source of 
randomness among the nodes. In LinBFT, this is provided by a 
VRF on the threshold signature that finalizes the previous block 
at height l–1. In particular, we have: 
Li = H(ts(CCl–1) | i) mod n, (2) 
where CCl–1 is the last commit certificate at the previous block 
height l–1, and ts(CCl–1) is the threshold signature indicating 
that 2f+1 participants have signed CCl–1. In LinBFT, ts(CCl–1) 
authorizes a node to finalize its corresponding block (after 
verifying its transactions), which is first generated by the leader 
of the last round at height l–1. Based on the assumption that the 
adversary takes time to corrupt nodes, which equals the 
duration from the creation of ts(CCl–1) at the last leader and the 
beginning of the protocol at height l, the output of the VRF 
above is unpredictable to the adversary beforehand. Meanwhile, 
the VRF is clearly known to all nodes that have finalized at 
height l–1, which is a necessary condition for entering the 
protocol for height l. An example is shown in Fig. 2. 
 
Fig. 2 Example random leader selection for three consecutive blocks.   
6 Other causes of a view change include a malicious leader proposes 
multiple blocks or one containing invalid transactions, or a non-leader 
node proposes a block. Such behaviors are punished by slashing. 
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With random leaders, the number of view changes in a 
synchronized network becomes O(1), unless with negligible 
probability. Since each view change takes O(n) transmissions, 
the total communication cost for all view changes is still O(n), 
unless with negligible probability. 
Finally, note that Equation (2) chooses a leader by random 
sampling with replacement. Thus, theoretically, it is possible 
that it always selects a malicious leader, though with 
exponentially diminishing probability as the process goes on. 
As a result, the liveness guarantee of the protocol becomes 
probabilistic rather than deterministic. To address this issue, it 
suffices to modify the above leader selection algorithm by 
generating a random permutation of the n nodes using the 
common random source H(ts(CCl–1)), and choosing leaders 
round-robin according to this permutation. 
C. Handling Changes in the Participant Set 
Recall from Section III-E that nodes may join or leave the 
participant set at the beginning of each epoch. LinBFT follows 
the common practice (e.g., as in [18]) that the current 
participant set (e.g., at Epoch e) collectively decide on the next 
participant set at Epoch e+1. Within Epoch e, two tasks need to 
be performed regarding participant set updates. First, the nodes 
need to reach consensus on what are the updates to the current 
participant set in the next epoch. Otherwise, at Epoch e+1, there 
can be a fork on the participant set, i.e., different nodes may 
have conflicting views of the updated participant set. In 
LinBFT, this may lead to perpetual leadership contention, 
meaning that different honest nodes disagree on the identity of 
the leader, defined in Equation (2), which violates liveness. 
To address this problem, in LinBFT, each update to the 
participant set (i.e., a node join or leave request) is simply 
treated as a transaction, which will be included in a new block 
to be added to the blockchain. The rationale is that since 
LinBFT guarantees deterministic safety and liveness, there 
must be deterministic consensus over the next participant set. 
On the other hand, reaching consensus in the presence of 
malicious nodes is essentially a BFT problem, for which 
LinBFT itself is the best known solution with deterministic 
security guarantees. Specifically, at the end of Epoch e, the set 
of join/leave requests contained in finalized blocks determine 
the changes in the participant set in Epoch e+1. In the worst 
case, these involve O(n) join/leave transactions, e.g., when the 
entire participant set is replaced. Since each block contains a 
constant number of transactions, an epoch needs to contain Ω(n) 
blocks, which agrees with the assumption in Section III-E. 
Second, LinBFT needs to run a DKG protocol to generate 
new public / private key pairs for each participant in Epoch e+1, 
which are required for creating threshold signatures. Note that 
LinBFT does not update keys incrementally, i.e., the key pair 
of a staying participant from Epoch e is still generated from 
scratch. This is because updating keys for threshold signature 
is tricky in general: for instance, consider the situation with (i) 
an existing participant set with n = 10 and f = 3, and (ii) 3 new 
participant entering the system, increasing n to n' = 13 and f to 
f' = 4, respectively. Here, the old and new thresholds are t = 2f 
= 6 and t' = 2f' = 8, respectively. Using a DKG algorithm based 
on Pederson’s verifiable secret sharing [17], the new and old 
secret keys are correlated with the new one adding two (i.e., t'–
t = 2) more secret terms. However, these new secrets can be 
derived by the adversary controlling f ≥ 2 malicious nodes. 
LinBFT generates key pairs using the DKG algorithm in [7], 
which requires O(n log3n) transmissions, and provides a  
probabilistic guarantee on the correctness of the keys (i.e., 
threshold signatures can be successfully created with these 
keys), where the probability of failure can be made arbitrarily 
small, e.g., below r = 10–18 as discussed in the previous 
subsection. This cost amortizes to O(polylog n) over Ω(n) 
blocks in an epoch, which is negligible in an asymptotical sense. 
In the unlikely case that the DKG algorithm fails, LinBFT 
still guarantees safety and liveness, as follows. Once a leader 
(say, Li) finds that it cannot derive a threshold signature from 
2f+1 signatures, it simply broadcasts the original 2f+1 
signatures without aggregating them. The protocol then 
proceeds without using threshold signatures, as in PBFT, which 
satisfies safety and liveness. At the next block height, nodes re-
run DKG to generate new key pairs for threshold signatures. 
D. Protocol Summary, Analysis, and Discussion 
The proposed protocol, as presented in the previous three 
subsections, is basically PBFT/LVC [1] with the following 
modifications: 
• Replace round-robin leader rotation with random leader 
selection according to Equation (2). 
• Replace the all-to-all broadcast of Prepare messages with 
an all-to-leader gather operation. The leader then derives 
the corresponding commit certificate CCi, defined in 
Equation (1), and broadcasts CCi. 
• Replace the all-to-all broadcast of Commit messages with 
all-to-leader gather. The leader then derives threshold 
signature ts(CCi), and broadcasts it. 
• Apply a speculative, O(log n)-time run in the ordinary 
case (Section IV-A). Fall back to the main protocol when 
the speculative run fails. 
• Fall back to all-to-all broadcasts in case of a DKG failure 
(Section IV-C). 
The following lemmas summarize LinBFT’s security and 
performance guarantees. The proofs follow directly from those 
of PBFT’s, and are omitted for brevity. They will appear in an 
extended version of the paper, if requested by the readers. 
Lemma 1 (safety). Given n ≥ 3f+1, after LinBFT terminates, a 
unique block is finalized and added to the blockchain. 
Lemma 2 (liveness). In a partially synchronous network, given 
n ≥ 3f+1, LinBFT terminates within finite time. 
Lemma 3 (linear complexity). In a partially synchronous 
network, unless with negligible probability, LinBFT terminates 
after amortized-O(n) transmissions given that (i) given n ≥ 3f+1 
and (ii) at most O(1) of nodes are slashed, where the 
amortization is done over an epoch of Ω(n) blocks. 
Finally, a public blockchain needs to reward participants in the 
BFT protocol as an incentive for verifying transactions. For 
example, the reward can be tokens in the form of transaction 
fees. One potential issue in LinBFT is that the block 
verification information, i.e., threshold signatures, do not 
contain the identities of the signers. Consequently, it is possible 
that a “lazy” node does not perform actions required by the 
protocol, and yet still gets rewarded for being in the participant 
set, which is unfair. A separate governance mechanism is 
required to address this issue: for instance, a leader could 
include in its proposed block the identities of nodes that are 
least active, and, thus, should be evicted from the participant 
set in the next epoch. Governance is an orthogonal issue that 
falls outside the scope of this paper, and is left as future work. 
V. RELATED WORK 
BFT protocols have been extensively studied in the traditional 
distributed systems setting, where a client submits transactions 
to be verified to a cluster of n nodes, among which f (satisfying 
n ≥ 3f+1) can be malicious. This is similar to verifying a single 
block in LinBFT’s setting, with the notable difference that the 
latter does not involve a client as a distinct entity. In the 
literature, an early influential work is the DLS protocol by 
Dwork et al. [9], which achieves safety and liveness, at the 
expense of O(n4) communication cost, which is prohibitively 
high for a large cluster. A decade later, Castro and Liskov 
propose Practical BFT (PBFT) [5], which satisfies safety and 
liveness in a synchronous network with O(n2) transmissions, as 
long as no leader failure occurs.  As pointed in [1], this is 
essentially an optimistic run, and the protocol falls back to DLS 
when the optimistic run fails. Later work, e.g., Zyzzyva [19], 
further improves the efficiency of the optimistic run. 
In traditional BFT research discussed above, it is commonly 
assumed that there is a fixed cluster of verifier nodes. 
Meanwhile, in many protocols, the same node stays as the 
leader unless a view change occurs. Further, an honest node is 
assumed to stay honest, regardless of the number of transaction 
batches it verifies. With these assumptions, the traditional 
setting is radically different from that of that of LinBFT. For 
blockchains, a popular deployed protocol is Tendermint [2], 
which is based on PBFT and runs consensus for each block with 
a rotating leader scheme, as in LinBFT. Tendermint incurs O(n2) 
communications in the ordinary case, and O(n3) with cascading 
leader failures. 
Recently, Casper [3] amortizes the cost of its BFT protocol 
by running consensus once for multiple (100 in [3]) block 
heights. This design, however, gives much power to the block 
proposer, which might lead to selfish mining. Hence, Casper 
involves a PoW mechanism for leader selection, which runs the 
risk of forks and 51% attacks. Hot-Stuff [1] improves the worst 
case communication complexity to O(n2), using a combination 
of linear view change and threshold signatures. SBFT [15] 
reduces the communication complexity of the ordinary case 
using threshold signatures and collectors. Omniledger [21] 
achieves O(log n) time in the best case, with the help of the 
CoSi protocol [25]. Nevertheless, to the author’s best 
knowledge, LinBFT is the first protocol that achieves worst-
case linear communication complexity. 
Another promising trend is BFT protocols with 
probabilistic guarantees on safety and liveness. For instance, 
Dfinity [18] uses a sample set of nodes to verify a block, where 
the sample is obtained through a random beacon powered by 
VRFs. There are two issues with this approach. First, since the 
safety guarantee is probabilistic, the sample set needs to be 
sufficiently large to obtain a low probability of failure (note that 
a blockchain system runs indefinitely, and involves an 
unbounded number of blocks). This means that Dfinity still 
needs a scalable, deterministic sub-protocol for the sample set. 
Second, since the sample set is usually o(n), which can be 
smaller than f, an adaptive adversary can corrupt them all. 
Algorand [16] addresses the latter problem with a probabilistic 
protocol that is robust against a powerful adversary, who is not 
only adaptive but has a strong influence over the network. 
However, as pointed out by Chan et al. [6], Algorand assumes 
the existence of a public key infrastructure, and is based on the 
assumption that a node can erase its own memory before it is 
corrupted by the adversary; further, the mighty adversary in 
Algorand needs to have a critical handicap for the protocol to 
work: that it cannot stop a message sent from an honest node to 
reach its recipients. LinBFT does not consider an adaptive 
adversary since (i) for a fast protocol, compromising nodes 
adaptively within one protocol run is rather difficult, and (ii) 
the only part of the protocol that is vulnerable to an adaptive 
adversary is random leader selection (Section IV-B), for which 
the adversary can break the probabilistic guarantee on O(1) 
leader rotations by corrupting a considerable portion of the 
nodes; this is difficult, however, for a larger n. 
Finally, several protocols distinguish malicious nodes who 
actively attack the protocol with falsified messages from ones 
that may fail-top (e.g., in [15]) or those that may go offline [24], 
and obtain stronger robustness in a setting where only a small 
fraction of nodes are actively malicious. LinBFT follows the 
more common honest/malicious participant model, and relies 
on an external governance module to disincentivize passive 
failures, as discussed in Section IV-D. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The paper proposes LinBFT, the first BFT protocol that 
achieves amortized O(n) communication cost, while satisfying 
deterministic guarantees on safety and liveness, as well as 
several properties desirable in an open, public blockchain 
setting. An immediate future direction is to implement LinBFT 
as a deployable prototype, and benchmark it against existing 
solutions. Additionally, it is interesting to investigate the 
combination of LinBFT with a randomized BFT protocol, as 
well as other scaling options such as sharding [21]. 
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